

2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Working paper submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran for Main Committee I

1. In the course of the negotiations leading to the NPT, a delicate and balanced package of rights and obligations was introduced according to which non-nuclear-weapon States undertake not to acquire nuclear weapons, and to place their facilities under the safeguard agreements. In return nuclear-weapon States undertake not to transfer and develop nuclear weapons and commit themselves to practical steps towards nuclear disarmament. Moreover all States Parties to the Treaty undertake to cooperate and ensure the implementation of the inalienable rights of the States Parties for peaceful use of nuclear energy in a non-selective and non-discriminatory manner.

2. Since 1978, when the final document of the SSODI confirmed nuclear disarmament as the highest priority on disarmament agenda, the international community had to wait for more than two decades to witness a comparable endorsement of its long sought goal in the final document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. We should not permit the new hopes for revitalization of the issue of nuclear disarmament to fade out again.

3. With the adoption of the 13 practical steps in the 2000 Review Conference, including the "unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament under Article VI of the Treaty", hopes for the implementation of this fundamental part of the NPT was renewed. The 13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the NPT, was considered to be the most important achievement of the 2000 Review Conference in the field of nuclear disarmament. This Conference would need to seriously consider the expansion of the national reports by the nuclear-weapon States with respect to their implementation of Article VI of the Treaty to the Conference, to include their measures adopted in implementation of the these 13 practical steps.

4. Since the 2000 NPT Conference developments in the area of nuclear disarmament have not been promising. Despite the obligations under Article VI and undertakings by the nuclear-weapon States in 1995 and 2000, in particular the 13 practical steps, the continued development and deployment of thousands of nuclear warheads in the stockpiles of the nuclear-weapons States are still threatening international peace and security.



5. The non-entry into force of START II agreement, the reluctance to pursue the START III negotiations and abrogation of the ABM Treaty are among the serious set backs to the implementation of 13 practical steps. The international community has noted the signature of the Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reduction in 2002. However, reductions as stipulated in this treaty are far below the international expectations for real steps towards total elimination of nuclear weapons. Moscow Treaty does not go beyond de-commissioning of nuclear weapons and Parties do not have any obligation to destroy their nuclear weapons. No verification mechanism is also envisaged. It, therefore, does not take into account the principles of "increased transparency", "diminishing role for nuclear weapons" and "irreversibility" which were agreed by the nuclear-weapon States in the 2000 NPT Conference.

6. During the 2000 Review Conference, the nuclear-weapon States committed themselves to "the further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as integral part of the arms reduction and disarmament process". In spite of that, no practical steps have been taken to reduce tactical nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States.

7. The adoption of the Nuclear Posture Review by some nuclear-weapon State, provides for the development of new types of nuclear weapons, possible use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and targeting nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons States Parties to the Treaty, in contravention with the assurances given by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the NPT and its indefinite extension. My delegation intends to address this issue as well as the general question of "security assurances" in its proper stage allocated to the issue in the Conference.

8. At the earlier stage, the questions raised over the new posture review were simply refuted as being based on an unofficial paper reports. Yet today in spite of allocation of hundreds of millions of dollars to projects aimed at developing mini-nuclear weapons or the so-called bunker busters, they are claimed to be simple research programmes. This Conference has an urgent task to alleviate the concerns of non-nuclear-weapon States over the development of new nuclear weapons and should consider a decision on prohibition of development and production of any new nuclear weapons, particularly mini-nukes as well as a ban on construction of any new facility for the development and production of nuclear weapons.

9. Moreover, real concerns of the international community over vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons transfer and deployment of nuclear weapons in territories of non-nuclear-weapon States, lowering the threshold of resort to nuclear weapons and the danger of using such inhumane weapons, in conventional conflicts and against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT, remains unabated.

10. In accordance with Article I of the NPT "Each nuclear-weapon State to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly". Contrary to this obligation hundreds of nuclear weapons have been and are still deployed in other countries and air forces of non-nuclear-weapon States train delivery of these weapons under the cover of military alliances. In the same context, the nuclear sharing between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States is also a grave source of concern for NPT parties. The nuclear-weapon States should comply with their obligations under Article I by refraining

from nuclear sharing, no matter what the pretext or under any kind of security arrangements or military alliance.

11. Furthermore, the Conference should reaffirm the total and complete prohibition of the transfer of any nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to non-parties to the NPT, without exception and in particular to Israel, whose unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and its continued programme for the development of nuclear weapons are a real threat to all countries in the Middle East and to the international peace and security.

12. Although as a positive note nuclear testing moratorium has been maintained after the CTBT signature, some efforts are under way in some nuclear-weapon States to allocate millions of dollars to reduce the time necessary to resume a nuclear test up to 18 months that put into question their commitment on moratorium. The prospect for the CTBT entry into force has faced a serious set back by the rejection of the ratification process by a major nuclear weapon State. Similarly at the time the prospect for commencing the negotiations of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty was high, the unwarranted insistence from the same country for excluding the element of verification from the negotiating mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee to be established at the CD has created an obstacle for the realization of this long-standing commitment of the international community. It is time to seriously consider that by changing the negotiating mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee, no basis is remained to allow for the commencement of the Cut-Off Treaty negotiations.

13. While the new issues such as terrorism, non-proliferation threats and the role of non-States actors should be dealt with, it is very unfortunate that these issues are abused as pretexts to justify the pursuit of programmes on new nuclear weapons system and the ignorance of nuclear disarmament obligations. Specific threats may not be resolved through resorting to more dangerous weapons with catastrophic consequences going well beyond any other threats in scope and effects.

14. The NPT Review Process should be able to reiterate once again its unconditional global call for the full implementation of the unequivocal undertaking of the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals and must assess the implementation of the 13 practical steps adopted by consensus in the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

15. Parties to the Treaty particularly the nuclear-weapon States should engage in good faith in substantive work of the Conference for the speedy and meaningful implementation of obligations under the Treaty including Article VI and the commitments made within 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences.

16. We continue to believe in the need for negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time limit, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention, and in this regard reiterate our call for the establishment as the highest priority and as soon as possible of an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament.